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Is there value in a two-step diagnostic 
algorithm to confirm SARS-CoV-2 in 
South Africa?
To the Editor: SARS-CoV-2 molecular platforms that attained 
Food and Drug Administration Emergency Use Authorizations 
are currently being implemented worldwide.[1-4] These molecular 
platforms incorporate at least two gene targets, with positive percent 
agreements (PPA) of 95 - 100% and negative percent agreements 
(NPA) of 94 - 100%.[1-4] The South African (SA) Ministerial Advisory 
Group on COVID-19 recently outlined a mass screening programme 
involving a broadened case definition, active community surveillance 
and extensive contact tracing, with the aim of undertaking ~30 000 
molecular SARS-CoV-2 screening tests daily in SA.[5]
We performed a hypothetical predictive study, using an average test 
prevalence of 3% (based on SA confirmed COVID-19-positive cases/
total cases tested up to 22 April 2020)[6] and test PPA and NPA of 
99%, taking into consideration possible pre‐analytical and analytical 
confounders.[7] The positive predictive value (PPV) and negative 
predictive value (NPV) for SA were 75.4% and 99.9%, respectively. 
We also compared predictive values, using similar accuracy, of other 
countries that have implemented different testing and screening 
strategies (based on figures on 22 April 2020)[8,9] (Table 1).
Traditionally, for disease screening, a high NPV and sensitivity are 
ideal.[10] Given the current situation in SA, reporting false-positive 
SARS-CoV-2 cases may be justified based on facilitating social 
measures to contain the spread of the virus.[10] However, when disease 
prevalence is low, such as the current SA COVID-19 test prevalence 
of 3%, near-perfect specificity would be necessary to prevent false 
positives.[7] The prevention of false positives is particularly important 
when extensive contact tracing is instituted, where the appropriate 
use of resources is essential.[11,12] Other possible issues are legal 
implications due to infringement of freedom rights and loss of 
personal income due to self-isolation.[13]
Several solutions may decrease false positives when the test 
prevalence remains low, including: 
• Performing reflex confirmatory molecular tests, using separate 
platforms with different targets, on screening positive samples. In 
our scenario, secondary confirmatory testing of positive samples, 
using a platform with similar accuracy, would increase the PPV to 
99.7% (Table 1). However, confirmatory testing may delay contact 
tracing, depending on local testing capacity. Combined high-
throughput screening and low-throughput confirmatory platforms 
may mitigate this. A cost-and-risk analysis comparing a single-test 
screening strategy and a two-step algorithm could be undertaken.
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Table 1. A hypothetical two-step model to confirm SARS-CoV-2 in South Africa and comparison with other countries*
True positive True negative Total
South Africa: test prevalence 3%
Screening, n†
Test positive 3 599 1 301 4 900
Test negative 36 128 838 128 874
Total 3 635 130 139 133 774
Confirmatory, n‡
Test positive 3 658 12 3 670
Test negative 37 1 193 1 230
Total 3 695 1 205 4 900
South Korea: test prevalence 2%
Screening, n§
Test positive 10 587 5 281 15 868
Test negative 107 522 800 522 907
Total 10 694 528 081 538 775
Italy: test prevalence 12%
Screening, n¶
Test positive 185 454 13 227 198 681
Test negative 1 873 1 309 446 1 311 319
Total 187 327 1 322 673 1 510 000
USA: test prevalence 22%
Screening, n‖
Test positive 840 230 30 213 870 443
Test negative 8 487 2 991 070 2 999 557
Total 848 717 3 021 283 3 870 000
UK: test prevalence 24%
Screening, n**
Test positive 132 160 4 264 136 424
Test negative 1 335 422 176 423 511
Total 133 495 426 440 559 935
PPV = positive predictive value; NPV = negative predictive value.
*Sensitivity and specificity of 99% were used for predictive calculations.
†PPV: 3 599/(3 599 + 1 301) = 75.4%, NPV: 128 838/(128 838 + 36) = 99.9%.
‡PPV: 3 658/(3 658 + 12) = 99.7%.
§PPV: 10 587/(10 587 + 5 281) = 66.7%, NPV: 522 800/(522 800 + 107) = 99.9%.
¶PPV: 185 454/(185 454 + 13 227) = 93.3%, NPV: 1 309 446/(1 309 446 + 1 873) = 99.9%.
‖PPV: 840 230/(840 230 + 30 213) = 96.6%, NPV: 2 991 070/(2 991 070 + 8 487) = 99.7%.
**PPV: 132 160/(132 160 + 4 264) = 96.9%, NPV: 422 176/(422 176 + 1 335) = 99.7%.
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• Implementation of risk stratification based on disease grading, 
and only doing confirmatory tests on ‘low’-risk cases (i.e. lower 
pre-test probability), may be more cost-effective but would be 
administratively challenging.
• Narrowing the case definition would improve the pre-test 
probability, but risks missing COVID-19 cases and minimises the 
benefits of the contact tracing programme.
We fully support the SA National Department of Health (NDoH) in 
expanding testing and contact tracing, and this letter is not intended as 
a criticism of the NDoH response, which has been widely praised. Our 
intention is to initiate discussion around the acknowledged challenges 
of mass screening and tracing programmes, and thereby, we hope, 
contribute in some way to the collective efforts in combating COVID-
19 in SA. Consistent low test prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 might 
rationalise a two-step diagnostic algorithm to support cost-effective 
mass contact testing and tracing. A reference test standard remains 
lacking, and NPA values of current testing modalities highlight the 
need for further COVID-19 diagnostic accuracy studies.[1,2,4] 
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